We present a framework for designing run-time faulttolerance using dynamic program updates triggered by faults. This is an important problem in the design of autonomous systems as it is often the case that a running program needs to be upgraded to its fault-tolerant version once faults occur. We formally state fault-triggered program updates as a design problem. We then present a sound and complete algorithm that automates the design of faulttriggered updates for replacing a program that does not tolerate faults with a fault-tolerant version thereof at run-time. We also define three classes of fault-triggered dynamic updates that tolerate faults during the update. We demonstrate our approach in the context of a fault-triggered update for the gate controller of a parking lot.
Introduction
Tolerating unanticipated faults at run-time is an important property of autonomous systems (e.g., Mars Exploration Rover) as such systems should guarantee a minimum level of behavioral correctness in the presence of unexpected environmental events. Since it is difficult (if not impossible) to anticipate all types of faults and to design systems that tolerate all fault-types, it is highly desirable to dynamically upgrade the controlling software of autonomous systems after the first occurrence of an unanticipated type of faults is detected so that subsequent occurrences of faults are tolerated. Such a run-time update should take place while satisfying (possibly a weaker version of) the program specification during the update. In this paper, we report our ongoing work on the development of a framework for the design of run-time fault-tolerance based on fault-triggered updates.
Several approaches formalize and present solutions for dynamic replacement of an old running program with a new program [18, 14, 15, 26, 2] most of which focus on the architectural and programming issues with less emphasis on the effect of faults and fault-tolerance during updates. For example, Kramer and Magee [18] present a framework for specifying and implementing dynamic updates at the architectural (components/connectors) level, thereby separating the functional updates from structural updates. Gupta and Jalote [14] present a functional approach for transferring the state of the old program to a state of the new program where the transfer functions are developed offline. Gupta et al. [15] propose a formal framework for designing and reasoning about dynamic updates, where online change is considered to be an instantaneous process using a transfer function (defined by developers). Duggan [12] presents a type-based hot swapping approach where programmers define two-way mappings that are reflected as type-sharing constraints during update. Stoyle et al. [26] introduce a safe transformer for dynamic update of imperative programs. Ajmani et al. [1, 2] present a middleware to support dynamic updates in distributed systems. All aforementioned approaches focus on updating programs and their components with less emphasis on automated design and dependability of such dynamic updates in the presence of faults.
We propose a formal framework for modeling and designing run-time fault-tolerance, where a program that does not provide any guarantees about its behavior when unanticipated faults occur (called the fault-intolerant program) is replaced with a fault-tolerant version thereof at run-time. Our proposed approach extends the notion of dynamic program updates in that updates are triggered by faults and tolerate faults. More specifically, we first formally define what we mean by an upgrade program in the context of faulttolerance. We then define the problem of designing faulttriggered updates and present a sound and complete algorithm for automated design of such updates. Subsequently, we define three classes of fault-tolerant dynamic updates.
Our proposed approach for the design of run-time faulttolerance comprises three main steps once a new type of faults is detected: (i) designing the new (upgrade) pro-gram (which is a fault-tolerant version of the running faultintolerant program), (ii) designing a fault-triggered update program for dynamic (i.e., run-time) replacement of the fault-intolerant program with its fault-tolerant version due to the occurrence of faults, and (iii) adding fault-tolerance to the update program. In our previous work [13, 24] , we have investigated the first step. The third step is currently under investigation. The focus of this paper is on the second step. Specifically, in the absence of faults, the running fault-intolerant program satisfies its safety and liveness specifications [4] , where a safety specification states that nothing bad ever happens and a liveness specification stipulates that something good will eventually occur. We present a sound and complete algorithm that takes the design of the running fault-intolerant program (represented as a finite state machine) and the design of its fault-tolerant version (which is designed in an offline fashion), and determines whether there exists an update program that enables the dynamic update of the fault-intolerant program with its faulttolerant version when faults occur. This way, subsequent occurrences of faults would be tolerated by the fault-tolerant program. The update program should meet three properties: progress, safeness and interference-freedom. The progress property ensures that the update eventually occurs. The safeness property guarantees that during update the safety specification of the fault-intolerant program will be preserved. Moreover, in the absence of faults, the update program must not interfere with the execution of the fault-intolerant/tolerant program. The soundness of our algorithm guarantees that the generated update program is correct-by-construction (i.e., meets safeness, progress and interference-freedom). The completeness of our algorithm ensures that if our algorithm fails to find an update program, then the fault-triggered update of the fault-intolerant program to its fault-tolerant version is not possible (under safeness, progress and non-interference constraints).
We demonstrate our proposed approach in the context of a parking lot example, where we design a program for updating the controlling software of a parking lot gate controller with its fault-tolerant version. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present some preliminary concepts. Then in Section 3, we specify the requirements of run-time fault-tolerance and define the problem of designing run-time fault-tolerance using faulttriggered updates. In Section 4, we present an algorithm for automated design of fault-triggered updates. We demonstrate our algorithm in the context of the parking lot example in Section 5. In Section 6, we define three classes of dynamic updates that tolerate faults during update. We discuss related work in Section 7. Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section 8.
Preliminaries
In this section, we represent the formal definitions of programs, specifications and faults from [5, 22, 24, 13] . Program. A program p is of the form V p , δ p , where V p is a finite set of variables {v 1 , · · · , v n } (n ≥ 1) and δ p denotes the set of program transitions. Each variable v i has a finite domain D i . A state of p is a valuation d 1 , · · · , d n of the variables of p, where d i is a value in the domain D i . The set of all possible states of p comprises the state space of p, denoted S p . The set of transitions of p, denoted δ p , is a subset of S p ×S p . A state predicate of p is any subset of S p . A state predicate X is closed in a program p (respectively, δ p ) iff (if and only if) ∀s 0 , s 1 :
A sequence of states, σ = s 0 , s 1 , ... is a computation of p iff the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) if σ is infinite, then ∀j : j > 0 : (s j−1 , s j ) ∈ δ p holds, and (2) if σ is finite and terminates in state s f then there does not exist
The projection of a program p on a state predicate X, denoted as p|X, is the program V p , {(s 0 , s 1 ) : (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ δ p ∧ s 0 , s 1 ∈ X} . In other words, p|X consists of transitions of p that start in X and end in X.
The union of two programs p 1 = X , δ 1 and
Each state in the state space of p u , denoted S u , is a valuation of x 1 , · · · , x n , y 1 , · · · , y m . We denote by s ↑ Su the image of a state s ∈ S p1 (respectively, s ∈ S p2 ) in S u , where s = d 1 , · · · , d n (respectively, s = c 1 , · · · , c m ). The image of s ∈ S p1 (respectively, s ∈ S p2 ) is a set of states d 1 , · · · , d n , y 1 , · · · , y m (respectively, x 1 , · · · , x n , c 1 , · · · , c m ) in S u such that for all possible valuations of y 1 , · · · , y m (respectively, x 1 , · · · , x n ) the valuation d 1 , · · · , d n (respectively, c 1 , · · · , c m ) remains the same. In other words, the image of s is a state predicate in S u . The image of a state predicate X ⊆ S p1 (respectively, X ⊆ S p2 ) is also a state predicate in S u , denoted X ↑ Su , that is the union of the images of all states s in X. The image of a transition (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ δ 1 (respectively,
is changed by transitions of that set. We represent the image of a transition (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ δ 1 (respectively, (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ δ 2 ) by (s 0 , s 1 ) ↑ Su×Su . The image of a transition (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ δ 1 (respectively, (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ δ 2 ) is a set of transitions in S u × S u . Let δ 1 ↑ Su×Su denote the set of transitions in S u × S u that is the image of the set of transitions δ 1 . The set of transitions of the union program (i.e., δ u ) is equal to (δ 1 ↑ Su×Su ) ∪ (δ 2 ↑ Su×Su ). If X = Y (i.e., S p1 = S p2 ), then the union program is equal to X , δ 1 ∪δ 2 .
Properties and specifications.
A property is a set of infinite sequences of states that is suffix closed and fusion closed. Suffix closure of the set means that if a state sequence σ is in that set, then so are all the suffixes of σ. Fusion closure of the set means that if state sequences α, s, γ and β, s, δ are in that set then so are the state sequences α, s, δ and β, s, γ , where α and β are finite prefixes of state sequences, γ and δ are suffixes of state sequences, and s is a program state. Following Alpern and Schneider [4] , we rewrite a property as the intersection of a safety property and a liveness property. Intuitively, a safety property states that nothing bad ever happens. A liveness property specifies that something good will eventually occur. For a suffix closed and fusion closed property, a safety property can be specified as a set of bad transitions (see Page 26, Lemma 3.6 of [21] ), that is, for program p, a safety property is a subset of S p × S p . A safety specification of a program p is a conjunction of all safety properties of p. Hence, for simplicity, in this paper, we assume that a safety specification is represented as a set of transitions B ⊆ S p × S p that must not occur in any program computation. Also, we say a transition (s 0 , s 1 ) violates the safety specification iff (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ B. A computation satisfies the safety specification iff none of its transitions violates the safety specification. A liveness property is represented by a set of infinite sequences of states, denoted L. A computation σ satisfies a liveness property L iff σ ∈ L. The liveness specification of a program is the conjunction of all its liveness properties. An example of a liveness property is a leads-to property, denoted P → Q, where P and Q are state predicates. A computation σ = s 0 , s 1 , · · · satisfies P → Q iff for every state s i , if P holds in s i , then there exists a state s j , for j ≥ i, in which Q holds.
A computation σ = s 0 , s 1 , ... satisfies a specification spec iff σ satisfies safety and liveness of spec. We say a state predicate I p is an invariant of a program p iff the following conditions are satisfied: (1) I p is closed in δ p , and (2) starting from every state in I p , every computation of p satisfies spec.
Faults. We follow previous work [10, 5, 22, 24] in using the notion of state perturbation for modeling different types of faults as state perturbation provides a sufficiently expressive means to represent a variety of fault-types (e.g., Byzantine, failstop, message loss, etc.). Formally, a type of faults f for a program p = V p , δ p is a subset of the set {(s 0 , s 1 ) : (s 0 , s 1 ) ∈ S p × S p }. We use p[]f to denote the transitions obtained by taking the union of the transitions in p and the transitions in f . We say that a state predicate FS p is an f -span (read as fault-span) of p from the invariant I p iff the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) I p ⊆ FS p , and (2) FS p is closed in p[]f . Observe that for all computations of p that start in states where I p is true, FS p is a boundary in the state space of p to which (but not beyond which) the state of p may be perturbed by the occurrence of the transitions in p[]f . A subset of FS p −I p that is reachable from I p by a sequence of f transitions alone is called the sub f -span of p from I p , denoted SFS p .
We say that a sequence of states, σ = s 0 , s 1 , ... , is a computation of p in the presence of f iff the following three conditions are satisfied:
The first requirement captures that in each step, either a program transition or a fault transition is executed. The second requirement captures that faults do not have to execute. Finally, the third requirement captures that the number of fault occurrences in a computation is finite. This requirement is the same as that made in previous work (e.g., [10, 5, 27] ) to ensure that eventually recovery can occur.
Fault-tolerance.
We represent three levels of faulttolerance (from [5, 21] ) depending on the extent to which a program satisfies its safety or liveness specifications in the presence of faults. Intuitively, a failsafe fault-tolerant program guarantees to satisfy its safety specification even when faults occur. Formally, we say that p is failsafe f -tolerant (read as fault-tolerant) from its invariant I p for its specification spec iff the following conditions hold: (1) in the absence of faults, p satisfies spec from I p , and (2) there exists FS p such that (a) FS p is an f -span of p from I p , and (b) every computation of p[]f satisfies the safety of spec from FS p .
A nonmasking fault-tolerant program guarantees to recover to its invariant after faults stop occurring, however, its safety specification may be violated during recovery. We say that a program p is nonmasking f -tolerant from I p for spec iff the following conditions hold: (1) in the absence of faults, p satisfies spec from I p , and (2) there exists FS p such that (a) FS p is an f -span of p from I p , and (b) every computation of p[]f that starts from a state in FS p contains a state of I p .
A masking fault-tolerant program always satisfies its safety specification (even in the presence of faults), and eventually recovers to its invariant. More precisely, a program p is masking f -tolerant from I p for spec iff the following conditions hold: (1) in the absence of faults, p satisfies spec from I p , and (2) 
Requirements of Run-Time Fault-Tolerance
In this section, we formalize the requirements of designing run-time fault-tolerance against unanticipated faults. In order to deal with the complexity of designing runtime fault-tolerance in the presence of unanticipated faults, we propose a hybrid design method by combining two existing approaches: dynamic program updates [18, 14, 15, 26, 2] and our previous work [13, 24] on offline synthesis of fault-tolerant programs from their fault-intolerant version. Specifically, since it is difficult (if not impossible) to guarantee that p o meets the requirements of (failsafe/nonmasking/masking) fault-tolerance against unanticipated faults f , we make the following design decision to support run-time fault-tolerance:
After the fault-type f stops occurring, p o will eventually be replaced with its (failsafe/nonmasking/masking) fault-tolerant version at run-time.
In order to realize the above design decision, we use our offline synthesis algorithms to automatically generate a (failsafe/nonmasking/masking) fault-tolerant version of p o , denoted p n . A dynamic update of p o with p n due to the occurrence of faults is called a fault-triggered update in the state space S u of the union of p o and p n .
In order to guarantee that a fault-triggered update eventually occurs, we first ensure that, once faults f stop occurring, the execution of p o does not stay in a non-progress cycles in ((FS o − I o ) ↑ S u ). One way to meet this requirement is to add monitors (detectors) to p o that verify whether or not I o has been violated at run-time. Such an addition of monitors to p o can be done while designing p o using existing approaches in the literature [9] that enable such a run-time monitoring. This is feasible because I o is known at design time. After the addition of such monitors, the program p o can stop executing once its state is perturbed
Second, we design a fault-triggered update program (briefly called the update program) to ensure that p o will eventually be replaced by p n after f stops occurring. A fault-triggered update program p = V o ∪ V n , δ is defined in S u . The set of transitions of an update program should satisfy three properties, namely safeness, progress and interference-freedom. The safeness requires that, during update, the safety of spec is satisfied by an update program. The progress requires that a state in the invariant of the fault-tolerant program (i.e., (I n ↑ S u )) is eventually reached. Intuitively, the interference-freedom requires that, in the absence of faults, the execution of the update program does not violate either the specification or the invariant of the fault-intolerant (respectively, fault-tolerant) program.
In order to meet the progress requirement, we must ensure that a state in (I n ↑ S u ) is eventually reached from any state in SFS o ↑ S u . This is in fact a leads-to requirement that an update program must fulfill. Formally, we require that any program designed for updating p o with its faulttolerant version p n satisfies (SFS o ↑ S u ) → (I n ↑ S u ). Intuitively, starting from any state that is an image of SFS o in S u , the update program will eventually reach a state that is an image of I n in S u .
In order to ensure interference-freedom, the update program must not include transitions that execute inside I o ↑ S u or I n ↑ S u (i.e., {(s 0 , s 1 )|(s 0 , s 1 
Moreover, the update program must not violate the closure of I o ↑ S u or I n ↑ S u ; i.e., the update program must not include the set of transitions {(s 0 , s 1 
The conjunction of the above requirements results in excluding any transition that starts in either Identify an update program p = V o ∪ V n , δ in the state space S u of the union of p o and p n such that (1) p satisfies the safety of spec,
2 Soundness and completeness. An algorithm for solving the update problem is sound iff for any given input, its output meets the requirements of the update problem. An algorithm for the update problem is complete iff for any given input if there exists a fault-triggered update program that meets the requirements of the update problem, then the algorithm always finds a program with a non-empty set of transitions δ. Comment on the problem statement. We consider cases where faults f perturb the state of p o outside its invariant 
Designing Fault-Triggered Updates
In this section, we present a sound and complete algorithm to solve the update problem defined in the previous section. Our goal is to design a program p in the state space S u of the union of p o and p n such that p meets the requirements of the update problem. We present the Update algorithm (see Figure 1 ) for designing fault-triggered updates.
In the Update algorithm, the first three lines construct the images of the sub f -span of p o from I o , the invariant of the fault-intolerant program and the invariant of the faulttolerant program in S u . Line 4 initializes a state predicate R 0 , a set of transitions δ and an integer variable i. The repeat-until loop in Lines 5-8 iteratively constructs the set of transitions of the update program. Specifically, we first identify the set of states R 1 from where a single-step recovery transition to the invariant of the fault-tolerant program (i.e., R 0 = I n ) is feasible. Such transitions should not violate the safety of spec and their source state s 0 must be outside I o and I n . We include all these transitions in the set of transitions δ. In the next iteration, we identify the set of states R 2 from where a single-step recovery to R 1 can be added. Continuing thus, we reach a point where no more single-step recovery to R i is possible. The termination of the algorithm is guaranteed by the fact that, in each iteration, a set of states is excluded. If the image of the sub f -span of p o in S u includes states that do not belong to the state predicate ∪ i k=0 R k , then it means there are states reachable by fault transitions from where I n cannot be reached. Otherwise, the set of transitions in δ constructs the set of transitions of the update program. (1) and (3) of the update problem are satisfied by construction as the Update algorithm includes only transitions that meet those requirements. Consider the following loop invariant for the Lines 5 to 8 (see Figure 1 ): I n is reachable from every state of R i . The loop invariant is clearly true before the first iteration. Steps 5 and 6 preserve the loop invariant as they do not modify R i . Step 7 satisfies the loop invariant by the construction of the set of states R i+1 . At termination, the loop invariant holds since R i = ∅. Thus, I n is reachable from every state of ∪ i k=0 R k . Therefore, the progress requirements is met since SFS is a subset of the union of all R i predicates.
2 Theorem 4. 2 The Update algorithm is complete. Proof. Let p = V o ∪ V n , δ be a program for updating a fault-intolerant program p o = V o , δ o with p n = V n , δ n and our algorithm fails to find p . Since p is an f -triggered update program that meets the requirements of the update problem, all transitions of δ satisfy the safety of spec (Requirement (1)). Also, no transition in δ starts in I o (respectively, I n ) or terminates in I o (Requirement (3) ). Moreover, from every state in SFS (see Figure 1 ), the program p should meet the progress requirement. Thus, an arbitrary computation prefix c = s 0 , · · · , s k (k ≥ 1) of p that starts in a state in SFS must ensure reachability of a state in I n ; c does not include any repeated and deadlock states (i.e., all s i states, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, are distinct and have some outgoing transition(s)). Let s 0 ∈ SFS and s k ∈ I n . Since p is a correct update program, the transition (s k−1 , s k ) must meet the requirements (1) and (3) of the update problem. Hence, s k−1 ∈ R 1 must hold, i.e., our algorithm would include s k−1 in the state predicate R 1 on Line 5. Likewise, the transition (s k−1 , s k ) would be included in δ on Line 6. A similar argument holds for s k−2 and the transition (s k−2 , s k−1 ). Inductively, s 0 (respectively, (s 0 , s 1 )) would be included in R k (respectively, δ). Since our algorithm declares failure if there exist states in SFS from where I n is not reachable, it follows that our algorithm would have found the prefix c. Therefore, our algorithm is complete. ( 2 ) I n := {s|(s ∈ S u ) ∧ (∃s 0 : (s 0 ∈ I n ) : (s ∈ s 0 ↑ S u ))};
( 3 ) R 0 := I n ; δ := ∅; i := 0; can also be computed in polynomial time. The rest of the algorithm consists of polynomial-time steps as well. Therefore, the complexity of the Update algorithm is polynomial in the state space of the union program.
2 Comment on the scalability of our algorithm. While the complexity of synthesizing fault-triggered dynamic updates is polynomial in S u , the state space of the union program has an exponential size with respect to the number of the variables of p o and p n . This may limit the applicability of our algorithm for real-world programs. We argue that such an algorithm has the potential to provide insight for developers in generating strategies that should be taken for the implementation of fault-triggered dynamic updates (respectively, adaptation). Moreover, our algorithm can be used for model-driven development of fault-triggered dynamic updates (respectively, adaptation) as the state space of the abstract model of a program is significantly smaller than the state space of the concrete program.
Parking Lot Example
In order to illustrate the Update algorithm, we use the parking lot problem (see Figure 2 ) adapted from [20] . The parking lot contains three spots for cars (marked a, b and c). There are two gates to enter the parking lot. Immediately after each gate, there is a space where the customer can drop the car off (marked l and r). If the gate is open, the customer may leave the car in this spot. The car will then be moved to one of the spots (a, b or c). We assume that if the car is being moved from l or r to a, b or c, no car can enter during this move. At the exit, there is one door. A car parked in spots a, b or c can leave through this door. However, only one car can leave the parking lot at a time. All doors are one-way, i.e., cars in spots l and r cannot leave and a car cannot enter in spots a, b or c.
Thus, in the parking lot problem, there are three possible events: (1) a car could be dropped off at the left gate and (possibly) moved to the spots a, b or c, (2) a car could be dropped off at the right gate and (possibly) moved to the spots a, b or c, or (3) a car could exit. For simplicity, we assume that each event is atomic. Also, we assume that in each spot there can be at most one car. Now, we describe the state space of the fault-intolerant program, its invariant, its safety specification, and its transitions.
Variables and the state space of the fault-intolerant program (p o ). To model the parking lot, we maintain three variables; x, y and z. The variable x denotes the number of cars that can be let in through the left gate, y denotes the number of cars that can be let in through the right gate, and z denotes the number of cars in the lot. Hence, the left (respectively, right) gate is open when x (respectively, y) is positive. The domain of x and y is {0, 1, 2, 3}. The domain of z is {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. A state of p o is obtained by assigning each variable a value from its domain. Thus, the state space of p o contains 4x4x6 (=96) states.
Transitions (δ o ). For brevity, we write program transitions in terms of Dijkstra's guarded commands [11] . A guarded command (also called an action) is of the form grd −→ st, where grd is a state predicate and st is a statement that updates a subset of the program variables. The guarded command grd −→ st corresponds to the set of transitions {(s 0 , s 1 ) : grd is true in state s 0 and s 1 is obtained by atomic execution of st in state s 0 }. The faultintolerant program p o contains the following four actions representing the set of transitions δ o :
The first two actions let a car enter, and the last two actions let a car exit. Upon exit, the value x (or y) is nondeterministically increased so that a new car can enter. For simplicity, we do not model the actions corresponding to the movement of the car inside the parking lot.
Invariant (I o ).
We let the invariant of the faultintolerant program, I o , be x+y+z ≤ 3.
Safety specification. The safety specification B o requires that any car in the parking lot should be able to leave. Clearly, a car in spots a, b or c can leave. However, if spots a, b and c are occupied and there is a car in spot l (respectively, r) then that car cannot leave. Hence, it is required that if there exist three or more cars in the lot, then the program p o must not increase the number of cars. Also, to model the assumption that only one event (entry/exit) can occur at a time, it is required that the value of x, y and z can change at most by 1. Thus, the safety specification rules out the following transitions:
Notation. v(s) represents the value of a variable v in state s.
Faults.
The fault-intolerant program is subject to a fault-type F that allows a car to sneak in. Intuitively, by increasing the value of z, the occurrence of F may prevent the entrance of the cars while there is some room in the parking lot. We model the fault-type F by the following action:
When F occurs, the program p o may reach states in its F -span where any increase of z by program actions would violate the safety specification. In this example, we use automated techniques [13, 24] to design a failsafe faulttolerant version of p o in an offline fashion and then use the Update algorithm presented in Section 4 in order to design an update program for dynamically updating p o with its fault-tolerant version p n once F occurs. The failsafe Ftolerant version of p o is as follows:
The set of variables of the fault-tolerant program p n is disjoint from the set of variables of the fault-intolerant program p o . The safety specification and the invariant of p n have the same semantics as B o and I o except that each variable is replaced with its primed version. Once p o is dynamically updated with p n faults may perturb the value of z as both z and z represent the value of an input sensor to the gate controller. However, since p n does not increase the value of z if there are more than three cars in the lot, p n does not violate the safety specification if faults perturb the state of p n outside its invariant or z > 3. Designing the F -triggered update program.
We use the Update algorithm to design an update program p in S u . Each state of the union program p u = {x, y, z, x , y , z }, δ u has the form x, y, z, x , y , z . The state space of the union program, S u , has 9216 states and the set of transitions δ u is represented by all actions A 1 −A 4 and A 1 −A 4 . The set of variables of the update program p is the same as the variables of the union program, however, its set of transitions is automatically generated by the Update algorithm. The transitions of the synthesized update program are as follows: The action U 1 represents the set of transitions that recover to I n while changing x, y and z at most one unit (i.e., preserving the safety of spec). The guard of the action U 1 specifies the set of states R 1 from where a single-step recovery to I n exist without violating the safety specification. Likewise, the guard of the action U 2 defines the set of states R 2 from where a single-step recovery to R 1 exist. To gain more assurance, we have verified the parking lot example using the Spin model checker [17] . The model comprises all actions A 1 − A 4 , A 1 − A 4 , and U 1 and U 2 for which safeness, progress and interferencefreedom have been verified. The Promela model is available at http://www.cs.mtu.edu/˜aebnenas/ research/examples/pklt-rtft.txt.
Defining Fault-Tolerant Updates
The problem of designing fault-triggered updates (see Section 3) does not stipulate any requirements on the computations of the update program in the presence of faults. Specifically, an update program generated by the Update algorithm guarantees progress (i.e., update completes) after faults stop perturbing p o and provides no guarantees sound and complete algorithm that takes a fault-intolerant program and its fault-tolerant version, and automatically generates a fault-triggered update program. The update program ensures that, once faults occur, the fault-intolerant program is upgraded to its fault-tolerant version at run-time. The completeness of our algorithm is especially useful in that it provides an existence test for the design of faulttriggered dynamic updates and programs that adapt in the presence of faults. We also defined three classes of faulttolerant dynamic updates (respectively, fault-tolerant adaptations) depending on the extent to which system specification is satisfied during update.
As we pursue our ongoing work on the design of faulttriggered and fault-tolerant updates, we plan to implement a software tool for automated design of fault-triggered dynamic updates that tolerate faults. Such a software tool will be integrated in a UML-based framework for model-driven development of correct adaptation in the presence of faults. Specifically, given the state diagram of an old program and the state diagram of a new program, we automatically generate the state diagram of a program that would enable the adaptation of the old to the new program in the presence of faults. We are also interested in designing techniques that refine the update programs generated by the Update algorithm (presented in this paper) to support fault-triggered updates under distribution constraints.
